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INTRODUCTION
Few American legal doctrines have been as widely criticized as
governmental tort immunity.1 Perhaps prompted by critical
scholarship, federal and state governments began to limit tort
immunity in the late twentieth century. Following this trend, Utah
waived some tort immunity by enacting the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act of 1965 (the “Act”).2 This Act has three layers.
First, it broadly extends state immunity to every “governmental
function,” which is defined to include almost everything
government can do.3 Then, the Act waives immunity for state actors’
negligence and breaches of contract.4 Finally, the Act carves from
those waivers specific exceptions in which immunity is retained.5
One of these retentions of immunity is relevant here. The Act
retains immunity (notwithstanding any waiver) for any injury that
“arises out of or in connection with, or results from” the infliction
of mental anguish.6 This is a broad retention of immunity. It means
that a citizen cannot sue government officials for torts of emotional
distress (such as negligent infliction of emotional distress), other
torts arising from mental anguish (such as a wrongful death claim
based on suicide caused by a state actor), or for damages to remedy
emotional distress caused by other torts of negligence. The net
result? An individual who is physically harmed by a state official’s
negligence can recover in court while an individual who is only
emotionally or mentally harmed cannot—even if, in the former, the
state officials’ actions were less negligent or the plaintiff’s physical

1. See, e.g., Edwin Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 229, 229 (1925);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201, 1203 (2001)
(critiquing sovereign immunity generally) (“Sovereign immunity is an anachronistic relic
and the entire doctrine should be eliminated from American law . . . . [T]his entire body of
law is simply wrong and . . . should be banished from American law.”).
2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-1 to -38 (1965).
3. Id. at § 63G-7-102(5) (2020) (defining “governmental function” to include “each
activity, undertaking, or operation” or “failure to act” of any department, agency, employee,
or agent of a governmental entity).
4. Id. at §§ 63G-7-201(1), 63G-7-301 (2020).
5. Id. at § 63G-7-201(4) (2020).
6. Id. at § 63G-7-201(4)(b) (2020).
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injury harder to identify. Courts routinely dismiss suits brought
against state actors because of this retention of immunity.7
Utah should eliminate or limit this retention of immunity for
mental anguish. Tort immunity generally is largely indefensible,
and Utah’s scheme of retaining immunity is no different. Moreover,
this Note argues that Utah’s choice to retain immunity for mental
anguish while waiving immunity for physical injuries (even when
caused by the same negligent act) does not draw a sensible line.
Waiving immunity for mental anguish damages would be more
consistent with the concerns underlying the retention of immunity
than Utah’s current scheme, which therefore sends the message
that mental anguish is simply not worth the risks of compensating.
Finally, Utah is trending toward more expansive mental anguish
recovery against private defendants, and waiving government tort
immunity for mental anguish would be consistent with that trend.
Nonetheless, this Note concludes that immunity for mental
anguish damages is likely here to stay. In recent years, the Utah
Legislature has expanded, rather than contracted, governmental
immunity. The Supreme Court of Utah has also suggested limiting
immunity is the legislature’s privilege, though there are arguments
the court has authority to eliminate court-created immunity.
And while there are good arguments that the retention of immunity
for mental anguish is unconstitutional as applied in certain
circumstances,8 the court has distanced itself from the tools
it would use to restrict immunity. Thus, though the mental anguish
exception should be closed or narrowed, that seems unlikely
to happen.
This Note proceeds as follows. Parts I and II briefly review
governmental tort immunity in the United States and in Utah,
respectively. Part III argues the Act’s retention of immunity for
mental anguish is unjustified and should be reconsidered. Part IV
shows change is unlikely, and Part V concludes.

7. E.g., Keller v. Alpine Sch. Dist., No. 2:19-cv-874DPB, 2021 WL 1087383 (D. Utah
Mar. 22, 2021); Ottley v. Corry, No. 4:19-cv-87-DN-PK, 2020 WL 1939135 (D. Utah Apr. 22,
2020); Shively v. Utah Valley Univ., No. 2:20-cv-119, 2020 WL 4192290 (D. Utah July 21, 2020);
Osterkamp v. Salt Lake Cnty., 2:20-cv-00032-DAO, 2020 WL 5298866 (D. Utah Sept. 4, 2020).
The Shively case has an ongoing appeal. General Docket Letter, Shively v. Utah Valley Univ.
(10th Cir. 2020) (No. 20-4088).
8. There are also good arguments that other portions of the Act, such as the expansive
definition of “governmental function” are unconstitutional. See infra Section IV.
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I. GOVERNMENTAL TORT IMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Utah’s tort immunity is based on the same principles
underlying every state’s sovereign immunity. The typical account
for American sovereign immunity dates to pre-revolutionary
English common law, but the reality is more complicated—and
much more uncertain. Even 200 years into our history, it still
remains unclear why states have sovereign immunity.
A. Common Law
The classic explanation for sovereign immunity is that in
England, “the King [could] do no wrong.”9 The theory is that,
because the Crown could not be sued in its own courts without its
consent, American sovereign states cannot either.
The reference to a King is enough to make one wonder whether
this explanation has anything to do with American law.10 In fact,
it’s not clear that the modern sovereign immunity doctrine has
anything to do with English law either.
Immunity in England was more of a procedural “accident”
stemming from the nature of feudal structure than a doctrine
barring recovery.11 Instead, the stronger tradition (rather than
sovereign immunity) seems to have been that where there was a
right, there was a remedy—even against government.12 Indeed, as
9. See, e.g., Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 111 P.2d 800, 804 (Utah 1941) (Wolfe, J.,
concurring) (“Governmental immunity is granted on the old theory that ‘the king can do no
wrong . . . .’”); Frederick F. Blachly & Miriam E. Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability
in Tort: A Comparative Survey, 9 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 182–84 (1942) (“The maxim that
‘the King can do no wrong’ . . . has since continued in force.”).
10. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879) (“It is not easy to see how [this]
proposition can have any place in our system of Government. We have no King to whom it
can be applied . . . . We do not understand that either in reference to the government of the
United States, or of the several states, . . . the English maxim has an existence in this
country.”); Driggs v. Utah State Tchrs. Ret. Bd., 142 P.2d 657, 660–61 (Utah 1943) (“This
antiquated idea has certainly never had any place in American jurisprudence.”).
11. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 3, 3 n.4 (1963) (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d ed. 1898)) (noting immunity was an “accident” of the
procedural conundrum of the King enforcing a “writ” against himself); Nevada v. Hall, 440
U.S. 410, 415 (1979) (“The King’s immunity rested primarily on the structure of the feudal
system and secondarily on a fiction that the King could do no wrong.”).
12. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (“[I]t is a
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy,
by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.”); id. (noting the only time a remedy
at law did not exist for a rights violation was when “the only possible legal remedy would
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Professor Louis Jaffe argued, the maxim “the King can do no
wrong” originally meant the King was not entitled to do wrong—
the King’s wrongs remained mostly actionable.13
In fact, prior to the American Revolution, sovereign immunity
was less of a bar on recovery and more of a procedural rule about
how the Crown could be sued.14 The Crown’s servants were not
entitled to immunity and could be sued without consent.15 In fact,
common law suits against the Crown’s servants were common,16 at

be directed against the very person himself who seeks relief”); Id. at 55–56 (noting positive
wrongs “in vain would . . . be declared . . . if there were no method of recovering and
asserting those rights when wrongfully withheld or invaded”) (grammar modernized);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“[I]t is a settled and invariable
principle . . . that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its
proper redress.”) (citation omitted); Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 135–36 (K.B. 1703)
(Holt, C.J., dissenting) (arguing, in an opinion that was upheld in the House of Lords, that
an individual could have a suit against a Crown’s official because “want of right and want
of remedy are reciprocal”).
13. Jaffe, supra note 11, at 3–4. Professor Jaffe concludes that main force of the maxim
was largely procedural, since individuals could not proceed by writ against the Crown,
instead proceeding via petition. Id. at 18.
14. Id. at 18–19; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer & David L.
Shapiro, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 878 (7th ed.
2015) [hereafter HART & WECHSLER] (noting “many scholars have argued that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity . . . was less about whether the Crown or its agents could be sued than
about how”).
Much of the author’s research in this paragraph was presented to the United States Supreme
Court to make a similar argument. Brief of Project for Privacy & Surveillance Accountability
and Protect the First Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6–11, Egbert v.
Boule (No. 21-147) (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2022).
15. Jaffe, supra note 11, at 1, 9–10 (noting such suits did “not require . . . consent”);
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 14, at 880 (“While the King enjoyed at least a formal sovereign
immunity, the officers did not.”); David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive
Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 4 (1972); 17A MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
123App.01 (“[O]fficers could be sued personally for trespasses committed by them in the
name of the Crown.”).
Interestingly, according to Blackstone, officers’ liability followed from the Crown’s fictional
perfection; since the King, personally inseparable from the office of the Crown, could do no
wrong, any wrongs done in the Crown’s name were assumed to be caused by the evil of the
Crown’s servants, who were held liable. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 237; 9 WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 5–6 (3d ed. 1944). By the Seventeenth Century,
parliamentary lawyers did not separate the King’s personal and official capacities “because
they thought of the King as a natural man subject to law.” Id.
16. E.g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1029–31 (C.P. 1765)
(Camden, C.J.) (affirming damages award); Leach v. Money, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1001,
1027–28 (K.B. 1765) (same); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768–69 (K.B. 1763) (Murray
C.J.) (same); Ashby, 92 Eng. Rep. at 135–36 (Holt, C.J., dissenting).
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least against the local officers who most interacted with the people.17
The Crown itself could also be sued in common law courts for
infringing individual rights. Suit proceeded via a petition of right
(suit was had via petition rather than via writ because of the
anomaly of a King enforcing a writ against himself).18 Unlike other
petitions, the petition of right was granted as a matter of course
once the petitioner established that he would have been entitled to
proceed had his suit been against a private party rather than the
King.19 The King “could not refuse to redress wrongs when
petitioned to do so.”20
There was one partial exception to this. The petition of right
could not be used to recover from the Crown for the torts of the
Crown’s servants.21 However, scholars have attributed this
irregularity to difficulty in how to apply respondeat superior against
the Crown—not to a doctrine that either the Crown or its officials
were immune in tort.22
Thus, in common law England, sovereign immunity did not
mean what modern sovereign immunity doctrine takes it to mean
today. Injured plaintiffs could recover from both the Crown and the
Crown’s servants for the wrongs they committed.

17. Jaffe, supra note 11, at 9–15 (noting suits were less common against higher officers)
(quoting A.V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 189 (8th ed. 1923) (“The Reports abound
with cases in which officials have been brought before the Courts, and made, in their
personal capacity, liable to punishment, or to the payment of damages . . . .”)).
18. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 15, at 12 (noting the petition of right became the primary
means of suing the King).
19. Id. (noting petitions of right were granted “follow[ing] the nature of the ordinary
remedies provided by law”); id. at 15 (noting the King “could not rightfully refuse to do what
justice required . . . on a petition of right”); Jaffe, supra note 11, at 5 (noting petitions were
granted “not on the basis of expediency, but of law”).
Blackstone called recovery on petitions of right a “matter of grace.” 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 12, at 236. This was “historically inaccurate.” Engdahl, supra note 15, at 5. By
Blackstone’s day, any requirement of the Crown’s actual consent had been replaced by
“fictional consent” or had been shifted from the Crown to the courts. James E. Pfander,
Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial
Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 912 (1997).
20. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 15, at 8.
21. Jaffe, supra note 11, at 8.
22. Id.
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B. Early States
Sovereign immunity in America, on the other hand, is a bar to
recovery. Here, the government cannot be sued without its
consent.23 Thus, “relief which in England was available only by
petition of right could not be had as a rule in this country without
legislative consent.”24
While there is no question that sovereign immunity has been a
part of American law since the Founding, there is little to no
agreement about why American states have sovereign immunity.
The disagreement probably stems from a lack of clear historical
clues. Though the topic did arise in the ratification debates,
sovereign immunity was not discussed by the Constitutional
Convention.25 Almost 100 years after the Founding, Justice
Miller wrote that “the principle has never been discussed or the reasons
for it given, but it has always been treated as an established doctrine.”26
Scholars and jurists have given a variety of explanations for
why American governments have sovereign immunity.
One explanation is that the colonial legislatures naturally and
rightfully inherited sovereign immunity when they separated from
England.27 Unfortunately, though “some of the Framers assumed
that States did enjoy immunity,” whether states were immune if
sued in their own courts “is not clear.”28
23. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 478 (1793) (assuming the United States
could not be sued without its consent); THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 422–23 (Alexander
Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (“It is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent”) (grammar
modernized and emphasis removed).
24. Jaffe, supra note 11, at 20.
25. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1206–07 (collecting antifederalist arguments that the
Constitution would allow states to be sued without consent in federal court).
26. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882).
27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 422–23 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan eds., 2001) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to
the suit of an individual without its consent.”) (grammar modernized and emphasis removed).
28. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 101 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). Compare
CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 6–7 (1972)
(asserting there was immunity before ratification), with Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 101, 103
(Souter, J., dissenting) (concluding it “is not clear” whether pre-ratification states had
sovereign immunity) (citing John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1895–99 (1983)); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 764 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The American Colonies did not enjoy sovereign
immunity, that being a privilege understood in English law to be reserved for the
crown alone . . . .”).
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Other explanations are equally controverted. One argues that
sovereign immunity was based “squarely” on the English system and
that immunity was adopted both thoughtlessly and incorrectly.29
Another points to the Eleventh Amendment as a source of some
immunity,30 while others interpret that Amendment to either not
provide sovereign immunity31 or to not accurately reflect preRatification understanding (at least as it has since been applied).32
Another explanation is that courts have no jurisdiction over the
sovereign.33 Others include that the government representing a
sovereign cannot be liable for the fulfillment of its legitimate ends,34
or that the creator of the law upon which a right depends cannot be
held liable for a violation of that right.35 Some scholars tie immunity
to practical concerns, pointing, for example, to the financial
instability of the post-revolutionary states.36 And still others have
asserted that suits against the government are simply “subversive
of the public interests.”37
In short, the origin of sovereign immunity remains
entirely unsettled.

29. Blachly & Oatman, supra note 9, at 187; ROBERT DORSEY WATKINS, THE STATE AS A
PARTY LITIGANT 55 (1927) (“[S]overeign immunity was accepted without hesitation . . . [and]
without considering whether it was valid, essential, or desirable.”).
30. See Jaffe, supra note 11, at 20 (“As a result of the eleventh amendment individuals
could no longer sue a state eo nominee . . . .”).
31. E.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1205 (noting “a careful reading of the text does
not support the claim” that the Eleventh Amendment provides sovereign immunity to
states); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction,
35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1983) (arguing “the amendment did nothing to prohibit federal
court jurisdiction”).
32. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 332–36 (Random
House Trade Paperback ed., 2006) (arguing the Eleventh Amendment has been expanded to
make it “harder for twenty-first-century Americans to achieve redress [against the states for
constitutional violations] than it ever was in eighteenth-century England”); see also Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
33. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–16 (1999) (“[N]o court can have jurisdiction over
[the king.]”) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 242).
34. Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850).
35. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
36. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 418 (1979); Walter Gellhorn & C. Newton
Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 722, 722 (1947).
37. Gellhorn & Schenck, supra note 36, at 722 (quoting Gibbons v. United States, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 274 (1868)).
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Whatever its rationale, state sovereign immunity was never
absolute.38 Like in England, sovereign immunity generally did not
protect government officials in their personal capacities, protecting
instead the governmental entity itself.39 Local governments do not
enjoy sovereign immunity.40 Some Founders assumed federal courts
would have power to enforce enumerated limits on state power.41
and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Power allows
Congress to waive sovereign immunity for states in other cases.42
Moreover, states can waive their own immunity through
private bills or general statutes.43 And states did so, including for
tort suits. In so doing, they followed the lead of the federal
government, which waived some tort immunity through the
Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946.44 By 1961, New York, Illinois, and
California had each waived some tort immunity.45 Every state has
38. Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial
Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 527 (2003) (“The basic point is that ‘sovereign
immunity’ has never been a complete immunity . . . .”).
39. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 14, at 880 (noting suits against federal officers were
“a fixture in American law”) (citing Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804))
(allowing common law cause of action to proceed against a federal officer who purported to
act in his official capacity); Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1218 (“The Supreme Court long has
held that sovereign immunity prevents suits against the government entity, but not against
the officers.”) (citing, inter alia, Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968), and Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949)); Larson, 337 U.S. at 686 (noting “the fact that the
officer is an instrumentality of the sovereign does not, of course, forbid a court from taking
jurisdiction over a suit against him” when the suit is brought to create a personal liability);
see also Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (allowing injunction to proceed against state
officer who violated the federal constitution).
40. Lincoln Cnty. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing federal courts had
authority under the Constitution to enforce enumerated limits on state power). But Article
III jurisdiction alone does not seem to suffice. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (imposing immunity
in citizen-state diversity cases); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding Eleventh
Amendment immunity extends to arising-under cases).
42. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). This power is notable because Article I of
the U.S. Constitution does not give Congress power to waive state sovereign immunity.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
43. See, e.g., Harold L. Mai, Constitutionality of Special Bills for Private Relief, 6 WYO. L.J.
261, 261–62 (1951) (discussing New Mexico’s prior private bill procedure and a case that
struck it in favor of general statutory waivers).
44. Pub. L. No. 79–601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946). Earlier, the federal government had enacted
the Court of Claims Act, which authorized a legislative court to hear claims against the
government and award judgments. Pub. L. No. 37-92, 12 Stat. 765 (1863).
45. See N.Y. CT. OF CLAIMS ACT § 12; ILL. REV. STAT. 37 §§ 439.1–.24 (1957); Muskopf v.
Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961); see also Stanley Mosk, The Many Problems of
Sovereign Liability, 3 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 7, 8–9 (1966).
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since followed suit.46 Indeed, the supreme courts of some states,
including California and Illinois, have abolished governmental tort
immunity (though their legislatures have since acted to limit that).47
New York’s waiver of immunity was very influential. That act
gave consent for the state to be sued “in accordance with the same
rules of law as apply to an action . . . against an individual or a
corporation.”48 This scheme gave rise to the infamous
governmental-proprietary distinction, under which immunity is
waived for proprietary functions (i.e., those also engaged in by
private corporations), but not for purely governmental functions;
this distinction has influenced the scope of immunity waivers
across the country, including in Utah.49
*

*

*

While the classic account traces sovereign immunity back to
pre-Founding English common law, modern sovereign
immunity—a harsh bar on suits not consented to—extends beyond
its alleged predecessor, which was more of a procedural rule that
allowed suits against both the Crown and the Crown’s servants. In
addition, it remains entirely unclear where American governments’
sovereign immunity comes from. Sovereign immunity is an
anomaly, but one that states have enjoyed since the Founding.
II. GOVERNMENTAL TORT IMMUNITY IN UTAH
“Sovereign immunity was a settled feature of common law
when Utah became a state and adopted its constitution.”50 From the
beginning, it was based on the doctrine underlying every other

46. See State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Sept. 8, 2010), https://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/state-sovereign-immunityand-tort-liability.aspx, for a list of the statutes of each state.
47. Muskopf, 359 P.2d at 457; Molitor v. Kaneland Comm’y Unit Dist. No. 302, 163
N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 1959).
48. N.Y. LAWS 1929, c. 467 § 1 (amending N.Y. CT. OF CLAIMS ACT § 12-a).
49. Mosk, supra note 45, at 9–10 (noting the distinction in New York and California);
John W. Creer, The Utah Governmental Immunity Act: An Analysis, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 120, 121
n.7 (noting the distinction in Utah); Gellhorn & Schenck, supra note 36, at 723 (noting the
general assumption in the mid-1900s that governmental corporations should be suable to the
same extent as private counterparts); see also Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.,
306 U.S. 381 (1939).
50. Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 504 (Utah 1996).
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state’s immunity.51 Before passing its Governmental Immunity Act,
Utah’s approach to tort immunity closely tracked that of other
states and the federal government. After passing the Act, the
approach of the Utah legislature and courts to immunity has
fluctuated considerably, leaving a confusing body of law that has
trended toward increased immunity.
A. Pre-Act Immunity Jurisprudence
Drafted in an era of mistrust of government and adopted by a
people particularly skeptical of strong government,52 Utah’s 1895
constitution created a board of examiners with (exclusive)
authority to “examine all claims against the State.”53 Acting under
this provision, the board would review tort claims against the state
and submit recommendations to the legislature, which almost
always acted in accordance with its recommendations.54
Submitting a claim to the board was considered a plaintiff’s
exclusive means for tort remedies against the state. Thus, in
Wilkinson v. State, the court set aside a verdict won against a state
employee who had negligently created a canal that had caused
water damage to the plaintiff’s property because the constitution
conferred unique power to hear such claims to the board.55 As it did
so, it suggested that immunity was a common law doctrine—
meaning, today at least, that it was court-created doctrine.56
51. Wilkinson v. State, 134 P. 626, 630 (Utah 1913) (recognizing the “elementary”
doctrine that “in the absence of either express constitutional or statutory authority an
action against a sovereign state cannot be maintained”), for example, when recognizing
sovereign immunity, cited no Utah authority and instead cited a string of judicial opinions
from other jurisdictions.
52. See John J. Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government—The History of Utah’s
Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 311, 314–15.
53. CONST. OF THE STATE OF DESERET, art. V § 18 (1872). This text was copied verbatim
from the Nevada constitution, which Utah copied after three of its would-be seven
constitutional drafts were not approved for statehood. Compare id., with NEV. CONST., art. V,
§ 21; Flynn, supra note 52, at 317. This copied text was also carried over into the present
constitution. UTAH CONST., art. VII, § 13.
54. Creer, supra note 49, at 125 n.37 (noting that of thirty-five claims recommended by
the board in 1955, thirty-four were approved).
55. 134 P. 626 (Utah 1913).
56. Id. at 630. The Court affirmed Utah’s immunity as a general principle of law, not
as a statutory or constitutional command. Id. (noting the doctrine of immunity “is elementary
and of universal application” and that “there is not a single authority to the contrary”) (citing
cases from other jurisdictions). While courts may have viewed common law principles as
derived rather than created, cf. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), today common-law
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Courts viewed municipalities differently.57 As early as 1881,
courts held municipalities liable when their negligence caused
injury—if the injury was caused when carrying out a ministerial, as
opposed to discretionary, function.58 Thus, in a case factually
reminiscent of Wilkinson, the court held Salt Lake City liable for
water damage caused by the city’s negligent maintenance of public
waterways.59 Over time, and by the 1950s, the ministerialdiscretionary test evolved into the governmental-proprietary test,60
the test used in other jurisdictions.61 Municipalities could be liable
for injuries caused during proprietary functions, but not for those
caused during governmental functions.62
This shift increased government’s liability. Under the new test,
a municipality could be held liable if it caused injury during an
activity that did not have “a public or governmental character, such
as the maintenance and operation of public schools, hospitals,
public charities, [or] public parks.”63 If the government financially
benefited from the activity or competed with private business in
the activity, it was more likely to be a proprietary function,
during which the government could be liable for injuries
caused.64 As in other states, however, the distinction between
propriety and governmental functions became messy, rife with
incoherent decisions.65
principles are usually viewed as law created by courts, see Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107
CAL. L. REV. 527, 529–531 (2019) (discussing the prevailing modern conception before
offering a contrary view).
57. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 436 (Utah 1995) (overviewing municipal tort liability
in Utah).
58. Levy v. Salt Lake City, 1 P. 160 (Utah 1881); see also DeBry, 889 P.2d at 437–38
(collecting cases).
59. Levy, 1 P. at 162–64.
60. DeBry, 889 P.2d at 439.
61. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
62. Id.
63. Ramirez v. Ogden City, 279 P.2d 463, 465 (Utah 1955) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
64. Id.
65. DeBry, 889 P.2d at 439; see also Creer, supra note 49, at 127–29. For example,
operating a golf course, Jopes v. Salt Lake Cnty., 343 P.2d 728 (Utah 1959), a sledding hill,
Davis v. Provo City Corp., 265 P.2d 415 (Utah 1953), and a sewer system, Cobia v. Roy City,
366 P.2d 986 (Utah 1961), were governmental functions. However, operating a swimming
pool, Burton v. Salt Lake City, 253 P. 443 (Utah 1926), and a waterworks system, Egelhoff v.
Ogden City, 267 P. 1011 (Utah 1928), were proprietary functions. More poignantly, operating
a public hospital was both proprietary, Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975),
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Over time, courts began to apply the governmental-proprietary
distinction in cases involving the state, contrary to the Wilkinson
holding.66 In so doing, courts relied on cases involving
municipalities.67 This caused the once-separate doctrines for state
and municipality immunity to harmonize over time, both being
governed by the messy governmental-proprietary distinction.68
B. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act
Utah passed the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in 1965
against this constitutional and common law backdrop.69 The Act’s
purpose was to expand governmental tort liability. Indicative of
that purpose and the general sentiment, legislators expressed
worry that immunity was unfairly leaving plaintiffs injured by the
government without compensation.70 Those promoting the bill
criticized the very idea of sovereign immunity, calling it an
“ancient doctrine” that allowed government to remain an
“[un]responsible agency.”71

and governmental, Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978). Other jurisdictions have had
similar frustrations and incongruencies with the dichotomy. Standiford v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1233–34 (Utah 1980) (collecting cases); Gordon L. Roberts & Charles H.
Thronson, A New Perspective—Has Utah Entered the Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 UTAH
L. REV. 495, 513. One explanation for why the dichotomy has produced such incongruous
results is that the underlying premise (sovereign immunity) is itself unsound. Standiford, 605
P.2d at 1234 (citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955)).
66. Sheffield v. Turner, 445 P.2d 367, 368 (Utah 1968) (applying the distinction to find
operating a state prison a governmental function); White v. State, 579 P.2d 921, 923 (Utah
1978) (applying the distinction to find the activities of an industrial commission to be a
governmental function).
67. DeBry, 889 P.2d at 439; see also Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 351
(Utah 1989).
68. DeBry, 889 P.2d at 440. It is not clear whether this shift had happened or was just
about to happen when the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was passed. See id. (citing
Sheffield, 445 P.2d at 368).
69. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-1 to -38 (1965).
70. Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 167–69 (Utah 1996)
(Durham, J., dissenting) (overviewing the legislative history of the Governmental Immunity
Act). For example, a committee report noted “[t]here was virtual unanimity that
immunity . . . should be waived . . . for the negligent acts or omissions of employees.” Id. at 168
(Durham J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting Utah Legislative Council, Report of
the Governmental Immunity Committee 67–68 (1964)).
71. Id. (quoting Floor Debate, Statement of Representative Ray Harding, 65th Utah
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 11, 1965) (House Recording No. 2, Side 2) (“I believe that to allow a
person to commit a wrong and . . . to hide behind the ancient doctrine of [sovereign
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Despite this apparent skepticism of tort immunity, however,
the Act did not waive all tort immunity. The Act is structured as
follows. First, the Act retains immunity for “any injury that results
from the exercise of a governmental function.”72 Immunity is then
waived in general areas including for “any injury proximately
caused by [the negligence] of an employee committed in the scope
of employment.”73 Finally, the Act carves out of those waivers
narrow areas in which immunity is retained.74 One of these
retentions of immunity is relevant here. Notwithstanding the
waiver of immunity for employee’s negligence, the Act retains
immunity “if the injury arises out of or in connection with, or
results from . . . infliction of mental anguish.”75 That retention of
immunity is discussed more in depth in Section II.C.
Since the Act’s three layers are consecutive, the first-layer
definition of “government function” sets the baseline for the other
two. Thus, if an injury caused during a “governmental function”
does not fall within a specific waiver, the government is immune.
And, since the Act does not specifically waive immunity for
intentional torts, the government is immune against intentional
torts as well, as long as they are committed during a “government
function.”76 Further, if a cause of action falls within a specific
retention of immunity, that retention controls even if the cause
of action also falls within an enumerated waiver of immunity
like negligence.77
C. Post-Act Immunity Jurisprudence
Since passing the Act, the legislature’s view of immunity seems
to have changed dramatically, as has the courts’. Along the way,
the courts and legislature have created a confusing and turbulent
body of law.

immunity] is to be but an ostrich and put your head in the sand . . . . I think that we must
accept [our] obligations.”).
72. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-201(1) (2020).
73. Id. at § 63G-7-301(2)(i).
74. Id. at § 63G-7-201(4).
75. Id. at § 63G-7-201(4)(b).
76. See Dettle v. Richfield City, No. 2:13-cv-357-DAK, 2014 WL 4354424, at *9 (D. Utah
Sept. 2, 2014).
77. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-201(2) (2020) (applying the retentions
“[n]otwithstanding” any wavier of immunity).

1868

1869

Why Utah Should Waive Immunity for Mental Anguish Injuries

The original version of the Act did not define “governmental
function,” its baseline for immunity.78 Nor did it mention the term
“proprietary function,” which was the common law counterpart in
the governmental-proprietary distinction.79 Courts and scholars
took this silence as a signal that the legislature intended to give “the
courts flexibility . . . in fashioning consistent and rational limits to
governmental immunity . . . [having] the power to restrict the scope
of governmental immunity.”80
Using this assumed power, Utah courts applied the
governmental-proprietary distinction until 1980, using the
distinction to “limit the harsh results” of sovereign immunity.81
Both before and after the Act, however, the distinction was nothing
but incoherent and unworkable. The Utah Supreme Court
described it variously as “one of the most unsatisfactory [tests]
known to the law,” “impracticab[le],” a “quagmire,” and causing
“inevitable chaos.”82 And the test did produce “irreconcilable” and
“incongruous” results.83 Selecting a sledding hill and operating a
golf course were deemed governmental functions, while
operating a swimming pool was proprietary.84 And operating a
city sewer system was governmental, while operating a city
waterworks system was proprietary.85 In the span of three years,
operating a public hospital was characterized as first proprietary
and then governmental.86
Citing this incoherence, the Utah Supreme Court soon
jettisoned the governmental-proprietary distinction.87 The court
replaced the distinction with a test turning on whether the
government’s activity is so “unique” that it “can only be performed

78. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-1, 3 (1965).
79. Id. at §§ 63-30-1 to -38.
80. Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1980) (citing Arvo
van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 970 (1966)); see
also id. at 1235 (“This language gives this Court the power to define understandably and
logically the term ‘governmental function.’”).
81. Id. at 1233–36.
82. Id. at 1233–34 (internal quotations omitted).
83. Id. at 1233 (internal citations omitted).
84. Id. (collecting cases) (internal citations omitted).
85. Id. (collecting cases) (internal citations omitted).
86. Id. (citing Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975); Madsen v. State,
583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978)).
87. Id. at 1236–37.
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by a governmental agency” or on whether the activity is “essential
to the core of governmental activity.”88 Critically, change was
motivated by the incoherence of prior doctrine, not a belief that
government liability needed to be expanded.89 In fact, when
changing the test, the Utah Supreme Court openly criticized the
doctrine of sovereign immunity as itself “largely unsound.”90 For
the court, the reason the distinction had proved unworkable was
because it was founded on a doctrine—sovereign immunity—that
itself made little sense.91
Soon after the court developed its new test, the Utah Legislature
stepped in to supersede it.92 In a 1987 amendment to the Act, the
Legislature defined “government function” to include essentially
every action engaged in by government: “‘Government function’
means any act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of
a governmental entity.”93 The amendment specifically overruled
the prior tests, noting that whether an activity qualifies as a
governmental function does not depend on whether it is
“governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique
to government . . . essential to a government . . . function, or could
be performed by private enterprise.”94 In other words, the
Legislature changed the baseline from immunity for some
government activities to immunity for all government activities.
Only if the State specifically waived immunity could suit proceed
against it, in contrast to prior doctrine.
The Utah Supreme Court struck the amendment as
unconstitutional under the state constitution’s Open Courts
Clause.95 To do so, the court applied a substantive interpretation of
that clause first introduced in Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp.96 that limited the legislature’s power to abrogate common law
remedies.97 Under the Berry test, laws that eliminate previously
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1234.
90. Id.; see also id. at 1234 n.4 (calling the reason why American states enjoyed
sovereign immunity “unclear”).
91. Id.
92. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1987).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007 (Utah 2002); UTAH CONST., art. I § 11.
96. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
97. Laney, 57 P.3d at 1022.
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available remedies are presumptively unconstitutional and subject
to a heightened level of scrutiny.98 The court applied the test
because the 1987 amendment eliminated a remedy that existed
when the Open Courts Clause was ratified: before the 1987
amendment, the government was “not entitled” to immunity for
proprietary functions and could be held liable in torts caused
during those functions; after the 1987 amendment changed the
baseline for immunity, the government gained immunity in those
cases.99 The court also found the law failed Berry heightened
scrutiny.100 With the 1987 amendment struck, Utah was not
immune for proprietary functions.
The legislature responded by reenacting the same provision.101
By so doing, the legislature made explicit it had changed its view
on immunity. Whereas legislators supporting the original Act
hoped to reduce sovereign immunity and criticized the very notion
of sovereign immunity, legislators supporting the reenactment
suggested the opposite.102 One senator stated, “We are headed for
a showdown with the [Utah] Supreme Court; . . . hopefully . . . the
court will recognize the policy stand we are making.”103
Though the same constitutional arguments are at play, the court
has recognized the legislature’s choice and has yet to strike the
reenactment.104 In so doing, the court has distanced itself from
Berry’s substantive interpretation of the Open Courts Clause.
Though it had used Berry to strike other immunity-related laws as

98. Berry, 717 P.2d at 680. Specifically, a law eliminating a previously available remedy
is constitutional only if the government proves (a) the law provides a “reasonable alternative
remedy” that provides “essentially comparable substantive protection” or (b) the law
eliminates a “clear social or economic evil” and is a reasonable means of eliminating
that evil. Id.
99. Laney, 57 P.3d at 1023.
100. Id. at 1023–27.
101. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-201(1) (Supp. 2004); Adam Goldstein, Comment,
IV.A. Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 380 (discussing the reenactment).
102. Goldstein, supra note 101, at 385 (discussing legislative history).
103. Id. (quoting Floor Debate, 55th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 25, 2004) (Senate
recording tape no. 39, side A) (statement of Sen. Dave L. Thomas)).
104. Waite v. Utah Lab. Comm’n, 416 P.3d 635, 661 (Utah 2017) (noting Laney’s
abrogation); Jenkins v. Jordan Valley Water Conservancy Dist., 283 P.3d 1009, 1041 (Utah Ct.
App. 2012) (same).
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well,105 the court has criticized and limited Berry and its progeny to
their facts.106 Thus, the current Act retains a broad definition of
“governmental function,” one that encapsulates virtually every
governmental activity.107
From Utah’s constitutional commitment to a claim review
board through the confusing governmental-proprietary distinction
to an across-the-board grant of immunity subject to only specific
waivers, Utah’s path with immunity has been convoluted. Both the
court and the legislature have fluctuated immensely in their
approaches to immunity and have clashed with each other. In the
process, the two together have left a body of law just as
unsatisfactory as the original governmental-proprietary
distinction. This uncertainty makes legal scholarship on Utah’s
immunity all the more interesting; with such a convoluted history
to build on, the legislature and courts may see fit to reconsider tort
immunity, including for mental anguish claims. This Note argues
they should do just that.
As it stands today, the baseline for immunity analysis is acrossthe-board immunity for all government activities; only if the
legislature specifically waives immunity can the government be
sued. And though immunity is waived for officials’ negligence,
immunity is specifically retained for negligence resulting in mental
anguish. As shown in Part III, this should change.
III. UTAH SHOULD WAIVE IMMUNITY FOR MENTAL ANGUISH
Under the Act, Utah has always retained immunity for mental
anguish. The Utah Legislature should reconsider this. Both the
legislature and the Utah Supreme Court should reconsider Utah’s
105. McCorvey v. Utah State Dep’t of Transp., 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993) (striking a
damage cap because the state had prior immunity for negligently maintained public roads);
Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 349–52 (Utah 1989) (striking another damage cap).
106. Gordon L. Roberts & Sharrieff Shah, What is Left of Berry v. Beech—The Utah Open
Courts Jurisprudence?, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 677, 693 (noting judicial fluctuations in how to
approach constitutional challenges to immunity); see also, e.g., Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135
(Utah 2004) (modifying the Berry approach); Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg.
Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1224 (Utah 1999) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (“I would overrule Berry.”);
Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1028 (Utah 2002) (Wilkins, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“I would overturn Berry . . . .”); Waite, 416 P.3d at 646 (Lee, J., concurring)
(Berry’s history “has been marked by confusion, inconsistency, and ongoing revisionism.”).
107. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-102(5) (2020). The Act defines “governmental function” to
mean “each activity, undertaking, or operation of a governmental entity,” including those
“performed by a department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.” Id.
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retention of tort immunity generally. As discussed above (in Part
I), there is clear historical rationale for sovereign immunity
generally. In addition, and as shown here, Utah retains more tort
immunity than is justified by the rationales given for immunity.
This is especially true for mental anguish.
A. Rationales for Tort Immunity
Several rationales have been offered to explain governmental
tort immunity. Some purport to justify categorical tort immunity,
but these rationales fail. Others purport to justify only partial tort
immunity (that is, immunity for some functions but not others), but
these rationales are both qualified and questionable. They also do
not justify the level of immunity that Utah currently retains,
especially as it relates to mental anguish.
For ease of reference, this Note separates rationales into three
categories: logical, legal, and practical rationales.
1. Logical Rationales
There are at least three logical rationales for governmental tort
immunity (and immunity more broadly). First, an entity upon
which a right depends cannot be held liable for violating that right.108
Second, the state cannot break its own laws.109 Third, government
cannot be liable for the fulfillment of its legitimate ends.110
The first two rationales are closely related, and purport to
justify a categorical immunity for any law or right whose existence
depends on government. Both rationales rely on unstated premises
that may not be true. For one, both rely on the premise that the
relevant laws and rights depend on government for their existence.
Many have believed—our Founders among them—that this
premise is clearly false,111 but in any case, it is not a self-evident
assertion. Both rationales rely on an additional premise that either
the creator of a law is not bound by a law it creates or that a law
cannot be enforced against the entity with exclusive power to
enforce it. Only if these premises are adopted will the conclusion
108. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
109. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 975 (4th ed. 1971).
110. Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850).
111. E.g., Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 1513, 1515–19 (2011).
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follow that a law or right that government violates cannot be
enforced against it.
The validity of these premises is far beyond the scope of this
Paper, but some points bear noting. Initially, if presented
categorically, the logic forces the conclusion that government can
never do anything wrong that is enforced against it. This is an
untenable conclusion for any system of popular sovereignty that
features limited seats of government whose actions bind each
other.112 So, unless some rationale is given as to why government
should be above some laws but not others,113 the first rationale
must fail.114
Next and similarly, if the government itself is a product of law,
it is subject to law. For the same reason that government actions
that conflict with law are not “law,”115 government actors are
accountable to law when they violate it. If the background law is
that right implies a remedy, then government must provide a
remedy for its wrongs.116 This principle, of course, is nothing new;
it dates long into English history.117 For this reason as well, the first
two logical rationales fail.
112. E.g., AMAR, supra note 32, at 10–17 (discussing popular sovereignty); 4 JONATHAN
ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 230 (statement of James Iredell) (1876) (“[O]ur governments have been clearly
created by the people . . . . The same authority that created can destroy”). THE FEDERALIST
NO. 39, at 194 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (defining a
republic as “a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great
body of the people”).
113. One possible explanation is consent: government stands above all laws, except
when it consents to being sued for violating a particular law. See Jaffe, supra note 11, at 3
(citing FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 518 (2d ed. 1905)). This explanation seems to fail. Consent comes about
by law, or by changing law. How can the government’s creation of a second law (that giving
consent to suit on the first) make the first law enforceable against it? If the premise is that a
creator of law is above every law it creates, the government would remain above both laws,
neither being enforceable against it.
114. If the premises necessarily imply a false conclusion, at least one premise must be
false per modus tollens.
115. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
116. Id. at 163 (quoting 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 109) (“[F]or it is a settled and
invariable principle . . . that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every
injury its proper redress.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 225 (James Madison) (George W. Carey
& James McClellan eds., 2001) (“[A] right implies a remedy . . . .”). According to Blackstone,
the only exception to this was when “the only possible legal remedy would be directed
against the very person himself who seeks remedy.” 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 23.
117. Fritz Schulz, Bracton on Kingship, 60 ENGL. HIST. REV. 136, 165, 168 (1945) (arguing,
Bracton thought “law makes the king, [so] the king must make a return present to the law
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Finally, in a system in which there are multiple branches, each
having limited authority, “[i]t is hard to see…[why] the activity of
either one of these bodies would compel its being above the law.”118
For any of these reasons, the first two logical rationales fail to justify
tort immunity.
The third logical rationale is that government cannot be held
liable for the fulfillment of its legitimate ends.119 This has intuitive
appeal. Members of the public cannot hold the government liable
for the fulfillment of those activities that “the People” commissions
government to do.120 However, this rationale has a natural limit: it
justifies immunity only for government actions that are legitimate
ends. It does nothing to justify immunity for government actions
falling without that scope—which of course is where all the action
is. Government is not commissioned to commit torts. The
government’s grand commission surely does not include battery
without public necessity or the color of authority, trespass without
a proper warrant, or the failure to act as a reasonable person would
in pursuit of otherwise legitimate ends. Thus, even if government
were immune to suits arising from the fulfillment of its own ends,
that would not justify tort immunity. Utah’s retention of some tort
immunity, including for negligence causing mental anguish, thus
extends beyond the immunity that this rationale can justify.
None of the three logical arguments discussed here justify
Utah’s decision to retain some tort immunity.
2. Legal Rationales
Legal rationales in favor of tort immunity include that “no court
can have jurisdiction” over the sovereign121 and that a judiciary’s
order holding another governmental entity liable in tort offends

by subjecting himself to its rules”); Holdsworth, supra note 15, at 10 (calling it “well
recognized” that the Crown was “subject to the law” and “morally bound to do the same
justice to his subjects as they could be compelled to do to one another”).
118. Jaffe, supra note 11, at 5.
119. Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850).
120. Id. This reasoning seems related to the separation of powers issues undergirding
the political question doctrine.
121. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–16 (1999) (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 12,
at 242 (“[N]o court can have jurisdiction over [the king].”).
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separation of powers.122 Again, full analysis of these rationales is
beyond the scope of this Note, but some points bear emphasizing.
The first rationale proves too much and mischaracterizes the
nature of the judicial power. It proves too much because if courts
have “no” jurisdiction over the sovereign, there can be “no”
liability—ever. But all agree that immunity has never been a
categorical rule.123 The first rationale also seems to mischaracterize
the nature of the judicial power, which is sovereign power.124 This
is a key innovation from both the English and Lockean systems,125
and in both the federal government and in Utah, the judicial branch
has power to enforce Constitutional limits on the other branches’
actions.126 The judiciary, wielding sovereign power, does have at
least some jurisdiction over the sovereign. Moreover, the doctrine
of tort immunity was created by the courts, so it may remain the
courts’ prerogative to determine whether the doctrine should
continue or not.127

122. Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1232 (Utah 1999).
123. Jackson, supra note 38, at 527 (“The basic point is that ‘sovereign immunity’ has
never been a complete immunity . . . .”). Of course, there is the counterargument that the
courts gain jurisdiction over sovereign states upon the state’s consent—including upon
ratification of Article III. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 324 (1934) (“in
the plan of the convention,” there was “a surrender of this immunity”); 4 ELLIOT, supra note
112, at 543 (statement of Patrick Henry) (interpreting Article III to allow a state to be sued
without consent in a federal court sitting in citizen-state diversity); id. at 573 (statement of
Edmund Randolph) (same); id. at 526–27 (statement of George Mason) (same). But see THE
FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 422–23 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent.”) (grammar modernized and emphasis removed); Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 446 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting). However, consent does not create
subject-matter jurisdiction. But see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890) (while holding
that federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits against a state by a citizen of the same state,
noting that states may consent to jurisdiction). Even assuming that ratifying the Constitution
did effectuate a waiver of immunity, this does not explain the state’s pre-convention
suability. Jackson, supra note 38, at 527.
124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 270 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001) (“[T]he power surrendered by the people is . . . subdivided among
distinct and separate departments.”).
125. E.g., David Jenkins, The Lockean Constitution: Separation of Powers and the Limits of
Prerogative, 56 MCGILL L.J. 543, 577–80 (2011) (discussing the impact of Locke, Montesquieu,
and Blackstone on the Framers’ separation of powers).
126. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. This applies to Utah as well. See UTAH CONST. art. V, § 1.
127. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 436 (Utah 1995) (“Governmental immunity . . . was
created by the courts, not by the Legislature.”); Nieting v. Blondell, 235 N.W.2d 597, 600
(Minn. 1975) (“Therefore, it is this court’s duty and prerogative to determine whether it
should adhere to its own rule of tort immunity . . . .”); see also Molitor v. Kaneland Comm’y
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The second legal rationale fares only slightly better. Turning on
separation of powers, it suggests that courts should not hold the
legislature liable for harm caused by a legislative act, for to do so
would be to pass judgment on the legislature’s policymaking
authority.128 “Separation of powers never has been understood as
insulating the activities of other branches of government from
judicial review.”129 The United States Supreme Court has framed
the separation of powers inquiry as whether an action
“impermissibly interferes with the [other branch’s] exercise of [its]
constitutionally appointed functions.”130 Applying that analysis
here, tort liability would only offend separation of powers if
liability impermissibly interferes with the relevant branch’s ability
to perform its constitutionally mandated functions. It’s hard to
imagine tort liability that causes such an interference.
Indeed, holding an officer accountable for the tortious manner
in which she exercises legislative or executive prerogatives is
fundamentally distinct from judicial review over whether the ends
she pursues are legitimate or advisable. Whereas the latter could
implicate separation of powers concerns, the former does not. And
tort law deals with the former.131
Moreover, even if this separation of powers rationale were
taken at face value, it would not justify categorical tort immunity.
At most, separation of powers concerns would justify immunity for
legislative,132 judicial,133 prosecutorial134 and, perhaps, discretionary
functions for which liability for the tortious manner of executing the

Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 1959) (limiting tort immunity); Muskopf v. Corning
Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961) (same).
128. Mosk, supra note 45, at 15 (citing Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1917)).
129. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1218 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803), for the proposition that separation of powers is judicially enforceable).
130. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685 (1988); see also CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
851 (1986) (framing the question whether Congress’s decision to authorize non-Article III
courts to hear Article III questions as whether the vesting “impermissibly threatens the
institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch”).
131. See Creer, supra note 49, at 135.
132. E.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (recognizing absolute
immunity for legislators acting in their legislative function).
133. E.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (recognizing absolute immunity for
judges acting in their judicial capacity).
134. E.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (recognizing absolute immunity for
prosecutors in certain prosecutorial functions).
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function interferes with whether the function should be performed.
Only rarely will that limit governmental tort liability.135
Thus, neither legal rationale justifies tort immunity. Even if the
second rationale were taken at face value—which is debatable—it
would justify tort immunity only when liability would offend
separation of powers, a quantum of tort immunity so small that it
is hard to imagine.
3. Practical Rationales
Finally, there are practical rationales for immunity. These
include the following four rationales. First, government officials
should not be held liable for doing that which they were elected or
hired to do.136 Second, the public should be protected from the
inconvenience of paying to compensate emotional injuries caused
by government actors—those funds could be used to serve the
public interest elsewhere.137 A third rationale is that the possibility
of liability could make government officers overly cautious.138 If
they are too worried about being held liable in tort, they may
refrain from fulfilling their duties vigorously. Fourthly and finally,
liability could keep government from engaging in some activities
for fear of being bankrupt or being hauled into court. This Note
offers brief thoughts on the first three of these practical rationales,
concluding they do not justify tort immunity. This Note does not
analyze this fourth rationale because its strength rests on whether
one believes government should engage in the tasks that tort
liability would disincentivize it from doing—a policy question
without a clear answer.139

135. Nieting v. Blondell, 235 N.W.2d 597, 603 (Minn. 1975) (distinguishing the “tort
area” from “discretionary functions or legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative, and quasijudicial functions”).
136. Mosk, supra note 45, at 11.
137. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 459 (Cal. 1961) (citing Mower v.
Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 249 (1812)).
138. Creer, supra note 49, at 133–34. Another common argument is the sovereign
tortfeasor, as a practical matter, must consent to be sued because the sovereign itself enforces
the decree of liability. This is less relevant to state sovereign immunity, as the federal
government—a separate sovereign—can impose and enforce liability.
139. If government should be involved in those functions, immunity may be a means of
ensuring those functions are fulfilled. If government should not be involved in those
functions, then liability is a means of keeping the government out. Or if government should
be involved in fewer functions generally or more focused on other functions, then liability is
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The first rationale—suggesting that officials should not be held
liable for fulfilling governmental functions—is largely inapposite.
At bottom, the rationale suggests that government officials should
not be held liable for completing tasks legitimately engaged in. But
tort immunity does not prevent officials from fulfilling tasks;
rather, it prevents officials from fulfilling their tasks in a way that
is negligently or intentionally harmful. No government official is
hired or elected to fulfill tasks in a tortious manner. On the contrary,
the public certainly expects reasonable prudence of public officials.
Formally, then, this rationale does not justify tort immunity at all.
Even assuming otherwise, this rationale could justify at most
immunity for governmental functions, which, by construction,
exclude proprietary functions.140
The second rationale—suggesting “it is better that an individual
should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an
inconvenience”141 only holds water if protecting the government’s
treasury “is more important than the benefits of liability,” including
compensating wrongs and deterring wrongdoing.142 This claim is
not self-evident.
Worse, however, the rationale poses a false dichotomy. The
public “suffer[s] an inconvenience” whether or not government is
immune in tort. The only question is on whom the government
places that cost. Whenever government acts tortiously, it imposes a
probabilistic cost (call it a “Tort Cost”) on all citizens: the harm
caused by a governmental tort multiplied by the probability of
being an injured party. The public pays the Tort Cost whether
government is immune or not—the only difference immunity
makes is to shift the burden from the few that are injured to the tax
base. If government does not enjoy tort immunity, taxpayers pay
the Tort Cost by diverting tax dollars to compensating those whom
government ultimately injures. If government does enjoy tort
immunity, then the public shares the probabilistic Tort Cost as a de

a means of forcing the government to allocate resources only to those functions which are
most important.
140. See supra notes 80–89 and accompanying text.
141. Muskopf, 359 P.2d at 459 (citing Mower, 9 Mass. at 249); see also Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (defending sovereign immunity because liability would make a state
“face the prospect of being thrust, by federal fiat and against its will, into the disfavored
status of a debtor, subject to the power of private citizens to levy on its treasury.”).
142. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1217.

1879

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:6 (2022)

facto tax: all citizens suffer a probabilistic injury, and those who
become victims pay the actual Tort Cost themselves. Those that
interact with the government more—who may be poorer—are the
ones left to pay for the torts, a sort of regressive tax that
concentrates the “public’s inconvenience” on the unlucky few.143
Either way, the public pays for government’s torts.
Furthermore, this second rationale is inconsistent with the
government’s purpose. Government is charged with serving the
public interest,144 and one of those duties is to reallocate among
citizens the cost of torts. Much of tort law itself can be explained as
an exercise in allocating among society the accidental costs incident
to a social world.145 The proposition that government should
reallocate these costs when caused by private individuals but not
when caused by government requires explanation. That the
government is charged with serving public interest suggests that it,
more so than private tortfeasors, should compensate its victims.146
“If the state is properly to serve the public interest, it must strive . . .
to achieve the goals of protecting the people and of providing them
with adequate remedies . . . .”147 Failing to do so through tort
immunity brings government in conflict with its own purpose.148
143. Of course, all pay in the sense that the probabilistic Tort Cost is distributed among
all citizens, who adjust their conduct accordingly. But the unlucky victims pay more. This is
concerning. If poor individuals are more likely to interact with government (and are
therefore more likely to be the victims of governmental torts), then tort immunity places the
Tort Cost disproportionately on the poor, when it could, through abolishing immunity, place
the Tort Cost on the entire tax base.
144. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 237–38 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001) (“[N]o form of government whatever, has any other value, than as may
be fitted for the attainment of th[e] object” of “advance[ing] the public happiness”); see also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay) (suggesting the same); THE FEDERALIST NO. 30, at 148
(Alexander Hamilton) (same). The authors of the Federalist Papers were not alone in
asserting government exists for the happiness of the people. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE
OF GOVERNMENT § 229 (C.B. McPherson ed. 1980) (1690) (“[T]he end of government is the
good of mankind”); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 128
n.8 (George Sharswood ed. 1875) (1765) (“It has become a favourite maxim that it is the great
duty of government to promote the happiness of the people. The phrase may be
interpreted . . . well, but it is . . . inaccurate . . . . It is the inalienable right of the people to
pursue their own happiness; and the true and only true object of government is to secure
them this right.”); DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (noting the “only legitimate
purpose of government” is to protect, inter alia, the “pursuit of happiness”).
145. Gellhorn & Schench, supra note 36, at 737.
146. See Nieting v. Blondell, 235 N.W.2d 597, 603 (Minn. 1975).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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In Utah, this very idea animated its 1965 expansion of
governmental liability; congresspeople stated it was unfair for one
individual to bear a burden that society is responsible for.149
The second practical argument posits a false dichotomy and
is inconsistent with government’s purpose. It does not justify
tort immunity.
The third practical rationale is that governmental liability
impairs its effectiveness150 because the threat of liability makes
officials too cautious. As a preliminary matter, governmental
liability could have little to no effect on an officer’s care if
government indemnifies officers for their tort liability.151 Utah does
so. In Utah, suit against the governmental entity is generally the
plaintiff’s “exclusive” remedy for injuries caused by officers.152 This
limits the impact liability has on the behavior of governmental
employees, minimizing the worry that tort liability would impair
officials’ effectiveness.
The rationale boils down to an argument that government tort
liability is inefficient. This seems wrong. Any threat of liability must
create an incentive for governmental actors to be more cautious. As
Justice Holt stated in a celebrated action in case for a parliamentary
officer’s rejection of his vote in an election, “to allow this action will
make public[] officers more careful . . . .”153 The incentive to
exercise precaution is socially optimal for private actors,154 and
there is no reason why the precaution efficient for private actors
would be too high for state employees, especially if the two are
engaged in the same activity (as is the case for proprietary
functions). In fact, governmental tort liability is inefficient only if a
negligence duty is too high a bar.155 Stated otherwise, government

149. Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 168 (Utah 1996)
(Durham, J., dissenting) (quoting Floor Debate, Statement of Senator Charles Welch, 65th
Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 11, 1965) (House recording No. 1, side 2)).
150. Creer, supra note 49, at 133–34.
151. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 495–500, 505–06 (2011) (discussing the impact of indemnification
on incentives).
152. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-202(3).
153. Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 135–36 (K.B. 1703) (Holt, C.J., dissenting; JOHN
CAMPBELL, 3 THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 1, 184–85 (James Cockcroft, New
and Revised ed., 1894).
154. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 206 (6th ed. 2016).
155. Id.
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tort liability is “too much” only if requiring public officials to act as
reasonably prudent people is not socially optimal. That seems absurd.
Finally, governmental liability does not create governmental
“negligence in the air.” The alternative to governmental immunity
is not strict liability.156 The alternative may be negligence.157 In
negligence, tort liability would only exist where a duty was owed
the plaintiff—and legislatures and courts can define the duties
owed.158 The too-much-liability rationale “assumes that . . . the
courts would prove completely unable to apply general principles
of tort liability in a reasonable fashion in the context of
[governmental torts].”159 Courts would apply general tort
principles reasonably, undercutting significantly (if not
eliminating) the worry that waiving immunity would lead to “too
much” liability. Like the others, this practical rationale fails to
justify tort immunity.
*

*

*

No rationale analyzed here justifies total tort immunity. The
few rationales that can be construed to justify some tort immunity
justify little to any. Each rationale analyzed here purports to justify
immunity; additional rationales strongly justify liability.160 In sum,
“governmental immunity for tort is an anachronism, without
rational basis, and has existed only by the force of inertia . . . . None
of the reasons for its continuance can withstand analysis.”161
The twentieth-century trend away from tort immunity was sensible,
and Utah should reexamine its retention of some tort immunity.

156. Creer, supra note 49, at 134.
157. Id.
158. Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860–61 (N.Y. 1968) (declining to
recognize new duty of police protection to every citizen).
159. Id. at 863 (Keating, J., dissenting).
160. For example, Utah legislators supported decreased immunity in 1965, including
tort immunity, “so as to make more justice” and because it is “not moral” to leave plaintiffs
uncompensated and it is unfair that one individual should bear a burden that the public is
responsible for. Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 168 (Utah 1996)
(Durham, J., dissenting) (quoting Floor Debate, Statement of Senator Charles Welch, 65th
Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 11, 1965) (House recording No. 1, side 2)).
161. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 460 (Cal. 1961).
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B. Waiving Immunity Would Be Consistent with Utah’s Increased
Recognition of Mental Anguish Recovery
Utah should reconsider its tort immunity, especially for mental
anguish. Utah has trended toward greater emotional distress
recovery from private parties, and waiving immunity for
government-caused emotional distress would be consistent with
that trend.
1. Early Pain-and-Suffering Doctrine
In the early twentieth century in Utah, there was no cause of
action for emotional distress sounding in mere negligence.162
Plaintiffs could recover damages for pain and suffering caused by
another private party in only three circumstances. These were
when a defendant acted willfully or wantonly,163 when the
emotional injury resulted proximately from a cause of action that
existed independently of the emotional distress,164 and, most
importantly, when the emotional distress was concomitant to a
physical injury.165
2. Later Expansion
In 1988, the Utah Supreme Court expanded plaintiffs’ ability to
recover damages for emotional distress from private parties by
recognizing a tort of negligence for the infliction of emotional
distress.166 Originally, a plaintiff could invoke this tort when a
defendant placed her in the zone of danger.167 The Utah Supreme
Court later allowed plaintiffs to assert this tort claim when a

162. Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 100 (Utah 1982).
163. Jeppsen v. Jensen, 155 P. 429, 431 (Utah 1916) (emotional distress damages alone
recoverable for willful and wanton conduct but not for mere negligence).
164. Lambert v. Sine, 256 P.2d 241, 244 (Utah 1953) (allowing emotional distress
recovery for wrongful eviction). But see Webb v. Denver & R.G.W. Ry., 24 P. 616, 618 (Utah
Terr. 1890) (pre-constitution, no mental anguish recovery in wrongful death action).
165. Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg’l. Med. Ctr., 791 P.2d 193, 201 (Utah 1990); see also Paul
v. Kirkendall, 261 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1953) (leaving unchallenged a jury instruction allowing
for compensation for “mental and emotional distress”); Picino v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., 173
P. 900, 902 (Utah 1918) (citing with approval rule that permits recovery for mental suffering).
166. Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 783 (Utah 1988).
167. Id.
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defendant inflicted emotional distress in a way that foreseeably
caused physical harm.168
In creating this tort claim, the court recognized that plaintiffs
have a protectable interest in mental tranquility.169 At the same
time, however, the court expressed concern about the predictability
of courtroom results,170 the verifiability of mental injury,171 and
unlimited liability.172 Recognizing the claim despite these concerns,
the court relied heavily on the fact that other jurisdictions had
previously recognized similar causes of action.173
In 2018, the Utah Supreme Court again expanded recovery for
mental anguish damages, extending recovery to “very limited
circumstances” when a defendant owes a plaintiff a special duty.174
To make this expansion, the court again relied heavily on the
examples of other jurisdictions and American Law Institute
recommendations.175 And again, in expanding recovery, the court
noted the same three concerns.176 The first was a verifiability
concern: a “need to ensure the genuineness” of mental injury and
causation.177 The second was a worry of unlimited recovery.178 And
the third was a concern that a plaintiff should only be able to
recover emotional distress damages when a defendant owes a duty
to him.179 These concerns mirror those the court articulated in 1988,
the last time the court had expanded emotional distress recovery,
meaning the court’s policy objections to mental anguish recovery
have largely remained constant.180

168. Candelaria v. Ellis, 319 P.3d 708, 710–11 (Utah Ct. App. 2014).
169. Johnson, 763 P.2d at 779.
170. Id. at 785 (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
171. See Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1998).
172. Boucher ex rel. Boucher v. Dixie Med. Ctr., 850 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 1992).
173. See Johnson, 763 P.2d at 779.
174. Mower v. Baird, 422 P.3d 837, 856 (Utah 2018).
175. Id. at 842–43.
176. Id. at 853.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Compare id. at 853 (concerns of verifiability, unlimited recovery, and duty), with
Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1998) (concern of verifiability),
and Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 785 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (concerns
of predictability and unlimited recovery).
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3. Future Expansion
The 2018 expansion marks the latest step in a trend toward
increased mental anguish recovery in Utah. It is highly probable
this trend will continue because the court’s concerns, which have
remained constant over time, are likely to become less weighty.
The verifiability concern will likely become less weighty as
scientific progress continues to make mental injury increasingly
verifiable. In recent years, scientific understandings of mental
anguish have improved, and mental anguish recovery has become
increasingly accepted. Even now, some scholars have argued that
emotional distress damages are no more difficult to quantify than
some economic damages like future medical expenses.181 fMRI
processes can be used to accurately identify pain sensations;182
future developments may mitigate exaggeration and related
verifiability problems.183 If courts continue to become less
concerned about verifiability, as they have trended to this point,
then a future court will have little reason to not permit greater
emotional distress recovery (as long as the other two concerns do
not become increasingly worrisome).
The second concern, that of unlimited recovery, will likely
remain important even with improved verifiability of mental
anguish. Scientific development can mitigate the concern of
unlimited recovery only by objectifying mental suffering. But even
if mental anguish were perfectly verifiable (a goal that science is far
from),184 it would not follow that all mental anguish should be
actionable.185 Thus, the unlimited recovery concern may remain
important going forward. There is no reason to think, however, that
181. Ronen Avraham, Does the Theory of Insurance Support Awarding Pain and Suffering
Damages in Torts?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW 94, 116–
18 (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015).
182. Tor D. Wager, Lauren Y. Atlas, Martin A. Lindquist, Mathieu Roy, Choong-Wan
Woo & Ethan Kross, An fMRI-Based Neurologic Signature of Physical Pain, 368 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1388 (2013).
183. Ronen Avraham, Estimating Pain-and-Suffering Damages, in 2 THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 96, 97–99 (Francesco
Parisi ed., 2017).
184. See Luis Garcia-Larrea & Roland Peyron, Pain Matrices and Neuropathic Pain
Matrices: A Review, 154 PAIN S29, S38–39 (2013).
185. This would be much like the role of proximate cause—a line-drawing exercise between
actionable and nonactionable but-for causes (“practical politics,” as Judge Andrews terms the
exercise. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)).
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the unlimited recovery concern will become weightier as science
improves. As verifiability becomes less weighty and this second
concern holds constant, a court should expand recovery.
The third concern, that of allowing recovery only when a duty
was owed, is not weighty because it is merely a stated preference
for the status quo—and one without additional substance. Whether
mental anguish injuries should be recoverable in situations in
which they currently are not is a question of duty—if the court
expands mental anguish recovery, the court will be expanding and
defining new duties. This is precisely what the court did in 2018.
Then, deciding to expand recovery for mental anguish, the court
framed the question as whether to “adopt a limited duty.”186 When
mental anguish becomes increasingly verifiable, the court will
likely consider expanding mental anguish recovery precisely by
asking whether a new duty should be defined. This concern,
therefore, will likely play little role in preventing future expansions
of mental anguish recovery.
Taken together, the court’s three main concerns are likely to
become less weighty. Unless the court articulates additional
reasons for hesitation, a future court should permit greater
emotional distress recovery.
How quickly change will be implemented is a different
question. As is evident in the 2018 decision, which expanded
recovery in “very limited circumstances,” the court implements
change slowly.187 If the future reflects our past, the Utah Supreme
Court will expand recovery only after other jurisdictions (and the
ALI) implement change.188 The area of mental anguish recovery,
nonetheless, is a candidate for future, expansive change.
The Act’s retention of immunity for mental anguish injuries
stands in contrast with this trend toward increased emotional
distress recovery. Since its 1965 version, the Act has waived
immunity for torts of negligence189 but has retained immunity for
any injury that “arises out of or in connection with, or results from
. . . [the] infliction of mental anguish.”190 Relaxing this strict
retention of immunity would be consistent with Utah’s trend.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
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Mower v. Baird, 422 P.3d 837, 842 (Utah 2018).
Mower, 422 P.3d at 856–57.
Id. at 856; Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 779 (Utah 1988).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301(2) (2020); § 60-30-10 (1965).
Id. at § 63G-7-201(4)(b) (2020); id. at § 60-30-10(2) (1965).
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C. Waiving Immunity for Mental Anguish Serves the Policies
Underlying Tort Immunity Better Than the Act’s Current System
The Act currently waives immunity for negligence resulting in
physical injuries but retains immunity for negligence resulting in
mental anguish.191 This distinction seems to follow from historical
disfavor for emotional damages. Yet, especially given Utah’s trend
toward taking mental anguish more seriously, the Act’s distinction
between physical and mental recovery makes little sense. Waiving
immunity for mental anguish could serve the policies underlying
tort immunity better than waiving immunity for physical injuries
does. That leaves the legislature with little reason to not retain
immunity for mental anguish.
The legislature originally passed the Act to expand government
liability in tort,192 but some legislators “felt that it [was] in the best
interest of the public” to retain immunity for certain injuries,
including mental anguish.193 Why? Likely because legislators (as
most others) were skeptical of mental anguish generally and were
worried waiving immunity for a not-well-understood injury would
result in the government paying out far too much in tort
compensation. Mental anguish was viewed with much greater
skepticism than it is now.194 Experts thought pervasive stigma of
mental illness was caused by beliefs that the mentally ill were prone
to violence, that the mentally ill were responsible for their behavior,
and that mental illness prognoses were likely inaccurate.195
These popular beliefs pervaded the law, causing a general belief
that allowing any recovery for mental anguish would open the
floodgates to contrived injuries that were impossible to identify
191. Id. at § 63G-7-201(4)(b) (2020).
192. Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1980).
193. Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 168 (Utah 1996)
(Durham, J., dissenting) (quoting UTAH LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY COMMITTEE 61 (Dec. 1964)).
194. E.g., Peter Hayward & Jenifer A. Bright, Stigma and Mental Illness: A Review and
Critique, 6 J. MENTAL HEALTH 345 (1997). Hayward and Bright review the literature
surrounding mental anguish stigma from the late 1950s to the early 1990s. Id. They conclude
that in the late 1950s, mental anguish was viewed very negatively, with a largely uninformed
public believing that the mentally ill were “dirty, unintelligent, insincere, and worthless.” Id.
at 346 (quoting J.C. NUNNALLY, JR., POPULAR CONCEPTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH: THEIR
DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 233 (1961)). Experts disagreed as to whether popular feelings
about mental anguish had improved or worsened by the mid-70s. Id. at 347.
195. Id. at 350–52.
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and quantify.196 The 1965 Act’s distinction between physical and
mental injuries appears to be a product of this stigma and was likely
viewed as a sensible way to ensure tort liability did not go “too far.”
However, the distinction is not well-suited to serve this end. If
the government wants to waive some immunity but wants to
protect itself from “too much” liability, it may make just as much
sense to waive immunity for emotional distress torts rather than
physical torts. This is because recovery for emotional distress torts
remains relatively restricted, is likely to expand in a predictable
way, and implicates similar policy concerns as those supporting a
retention of partial tort immunity. Waiving immunity for a
relatively restricted set of claims that are likely to expand in a
predictable way that is consistent with the policy concerns
underlying immunity seems to be exactly what a government
wanting to waive immunity but concerned about “too much”
liability would want.
Though its recovery is expanding, emotional distress recovery
is more limited than recovery for physical injuries or economic
damage. This was especially true when the Act was passed. Even
now, with mental anguish recovery at its high-water mark, the
court has taken care to expand recovery in “very limited
circumstances.”197 Unlike for physical injuries, recovery for mental
anguish injuries is clearly delineated and has been expanded only
when a special duty exists. The limited nature of emotional distress
recovery makes it an apt choice for a waiver of immunity.
As evidenced by the court’s expansion of recovery in “very
limited circumstances,”198 mental anguish is also the type of injury
whose recovery will remain relatively certain. Since the court’s
concerns about mental anguish recovery have remained constant,
the future of mental anguish recovery is more predictable,
especially given the court’s incremental approach. Though
recovery will likely continue to expand, expansion will
likely remain incremental and predictable, occurring only as
emotional distress becomes more verifiable and other jurisdictions

196. E.g., Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
585, 629–38 (2003) (identifying what the author believes is continued stigma in the courts and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
197. Mower v. Baird, 422 P.3d 837, 856 (Utah 2018).
198. Id.
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adopt change. This factor too makes mental anguish a good
candidate for an immunity waiver.
Finally, mental injuries implicate the same policy concerns that
support tort immunity. One of the three concerns limiting the
court’s expansion of mental anguish recovery is the fear of
unlimited recovery.199 As discussed, this concern will likely remain
relevant even as scientific progress mitigates the other two
concerns. The negligence theory underlying emotional distress
recovery therefore is—and likely will continue to be—constrained
by the same policy that supports tort immunity. This makes
waiving immunity for emotional distress more attractive than other
injuries that are constrained by distinct concerns.
Emotional distress recovery is relatively limited, its future
recovery is relatively certain, and it is—and likely will be—
constrained by the same policies that support tort immunity.
Waiving immunity for mental anguish would therefore serve the
Act’s purpose, which was to waive immunity without causing too
much governmental liability.
*

*

*

Tort immunity is not justified—an anachronism without a good
rationale. Waiving immunity for mental anguish torts would be
consistent with Utah’s ongoing legal trends, as well with the
purposes of the Immunity Act itself. The legislature’s concerns of
“too much” liability are attenuated with respect to mental anguish
because recovery for it will remain incremental, predictable, and
tied to the legislature’s concerns underlying tort immunity. Utah
should reconsider its immunity for mental anguish. There is no
reason not to.
IV. CHANGE IS UNLIKELY
Though Utah should waive immunity for mental anguish,
neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the Utah Legislature is likely
to do so.

199. Id. at 858–59.
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A. The Utah Supreme Court Likely Will Not Reconsider Mental
Anguish Immunity
Though immunity for mental anguish should be waived, the
Utah Supreme Court is unlikely to reconsider it. The court has
stepped away from its immunity-limiting tools and has shown
greater deference to the legislature’s decisions regarding immunity.
The courts have interpreted the retention of immunity for
emotional injuries almost as expansively as possible, holding it to
bar claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress,200 claims
based on injuries proximately caused by the infliction of mental
anguish,201 and mental anguish damages caused by non-emotionaldistress torts sounding in negligence.202
The court’s expansive interpretation of the mental anguish
exception is not surprising, given the Act’s expansive language and
the legal profession’s skepticism of mental anguish damages in the
1960s.203 What is surprising is the court’s back-and-forth approach
to restricting immunity and its failure to scrutinize the mental
anguish exception. There is no question the Act intended to retain
immunity for mental anguish injuries, but the court has engaged in
only limited analysis as to whether “mental anguish” meant
something different in 1965 than it does today, whether the mental
anguish exception violates the Open Courts Clause, and whether
the retention of immunity for mental anguish can otherwise be
restricted—in any way.204

200. Osterkamp v. Salt Lake Cnty., 2:20-cv-32, 2020 WL 5298866, at *5–6 (D. Utah
Sept. 4, 2020).
201. Ottley v. Corry, No. 4:19-cv-87, 2020 WL 1939135, at *3 (D. Utah Apr. 22, 2020)
(citing Larsen v. Davis Cnty. Sch. Dist., 409 P.3d 114, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 2017)) (retaining
immunity for all injuries of which the infliction of mental anguish is “at least a proximate
cause”); P.J. ex rel. Jensen v. Utah, No. 2:05cv00739, 2006 WL 1702585, at *3 (D. Utah 2006)
(holding that UGIA bars causes of action arising out of the infliction of mental anguish).
202. Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 34 P.3d 234, 237 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (holding
waiver of immunity for negligence bars recovery for mental anguish damages but does not
bar an entire negligence claim when other, non-emotional damages are pleaded). But see
Cabaness v. Thomas, 232 P.3d 486, 505 (Utah 2010) (allowing recovery of emotional distress
damages in breach of contract cause of action because mental anguish exception applies only
to the waiver of immunity for negligence).
203. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-201(4)(b) (2020) (retaining immunity for “any” injury
“arising out of or in connection with, or that results from” the “infliction of mental anguish”).
204. See, e.g., Shively v. Utah Valley Univ., No. 2:20-cv-119, 2020 WL 4192290, at *4 (D.
Utah July 21, 2020) (dispensing with arguments that the 1960s meaning of “mental anguish”
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Though the court originally interpreted the Act to give it “the
power to restrict the scope of governmental immunity”205 and
wielded that power quite aggressively to strike portions of the Act
as unconstitutional,206 the court has since stepped back from that
role to the extent of limiting away the precedential value of those
prior opinions.207
Much of the stepping away has been necessitated by further
legislative enactments, but the court has also failed to reassert
constitutional arguments in response to the legislature. For
example, after the court in Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.2d 1007, 1027
(Utah 2002), applied a substantive interpretation of the Open
Courts Clause first used in Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.
to invalidate the Act’s all-encompassing definition of
“governmental function,”208 the legislature reenacted the same
provisions that had been invalidated.209 Though the legislature
merely reenacted unconstitutional provisions and though there is
an additional argument that the legislature lacks the authority to
trump common law’s proprietary-governmental distinction in the
first place,210 the court has instead recognized Laney’s abrogation
and has purposefully distanced itself from applying Berry.211
Based on this example alone, it appears unlikely the court
would reconsider limiting the Act’s retention of immunity for
mental anguish.
If the court were to apply Berry to the Act’s retention of
immunity for mental anguish, it would almost certainly be struck—
Berry’s presumption of unconstitutionality and searching test make
it difficult for any statute to survive scrutiny.212 The retention of
did not include severe mental illnesses because the Utah court has not interpreted “mental
anguish” in that context).
205. Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1980) (“the Legislature
intended the courts to have the power to restrict the scope of governmental immunity.”).
206. See, e.g., Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.2d 1007, 1026–27 (Utah 2002); Condemarin v.
Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 364 (Utah 1989).
207. Parks v. Utah Transit Auth., 53 P.3d 473, 476 (Utah 2002) (limiting Condemarin to
University Hospital); Roberts & Shah, supra note 106, at 677–78.
208. The definition in turn being a response to Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1233–34.
209. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-102(4) (Supp. 2004); Goldstein, supra note 101, at 385.
210. Laney, 57 P.3d at 1028 (Russon, J., concurring).
211. Waite v. Utah Lab. Comm’n, 416 P.3d 635, 661 (Utah 2017); Jenkins v. Jordan Valley
Water Conservancy Dist., 283 P.3d 1009, 1041 (Utah Ct. App. 2012).
212. I have explained the Berry test. See text accompanying supra note 98. For
convenience, I repeat it here. Berry applied the Open Courts Clause to mean that an
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immunity for injuries arising from mental anguish, moreover, is a
clear case under Berry. There is no alternative remedy for those
whose claims are barred by the mental anguish exception. There is
no “clear” social or economic evil eliminated by the exception; all
policies supporting immunity that have been analyzed herein
either fail or are questionable. As shown, no policy supports total
tort immunity—neither categorical immunity for all torts nor
categorical immunity for any class of injuries, such as emotional
distress injuries. Rather than being a social evil, vindicating a
personal interest in mental tranquility is a social good, as evidenced
by Utah’s trend toward increased recovery of mental anguish
damages. Finally, even if the mental anguish exception did
eliminate a clear economic or social evil, it would do so arbitrarily
and unreasonably by conditioning recovery on the character of the
injury suffered, which is no fault of the victim, when allowing
recovery for mental anguish, as discussed, would better serve the
purposes of immunity and the Act.213 If Berry were to be applied,
the mental anguish exception would surely fail.
Yet, there are two reasons why the court would not even get to
the Berry analysis. First, the current court has shown disfavor for
Berry.214 Second, Berry only applies to statutes that violate the Open
Courts Clause by eliminating a remedy that existed at law.215 As
discussed, no cause of action for emotional distress existed at
common law before 1965. However, emotional distress damages
could be recovered if concomitant to physical injury, if defendant
acted willfully or wantonly, or when resulting from an
independently existing cause of action.216 The Open Courts Clause

enactment abrogating a prior held right is valid only if it provides an effective a reasonable
alternative remedy or if it eliminates a clear social or economic evil and the elimination of
that evil is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717
P.2d 670, 679–81 (Utah 1985). Justice Stewart has noted that the Berry test had been used to
strike only two statutes by 1999 and is essentially the same test used in a substantive due
process analysis by the United States Supreme Court. Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v.
Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1216 (Utah 1999) (Stewart, J., concurring).
213. Waiving immunity for emotional distress serves the purposes of the Act better
than waiving immunity for physical injuries. Furthermore, some economic damages are just
as difficult to verify as emotional damages.
214. See cases cited supra note 106.
215. Laney, 57 P.3d at 1021 (“If no remedy was eliminated, there is no need to proceed
with the Berry test.”).
216. See supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text.
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protects “remed[ies] by due course of law,”217 although there is no
clear consensus as to what exactly this entails.218 In any case, to
show that the Act’s retention of mental anguish eliminated an
existing remedy, a plaintiff would have to argue that, absent the
Act, her emotional damages would have been recoverable against
the government. The governmental-proprietary distinction was a
well-established component of tort immunity before the Act.219
Thus, before even getting to Berry, a plaintiff would have to show
injury occurred while the governmental entity engaged in a
proprietary function and her emotional distress would have been
recoverable absent the Act (i.e., it was accompanied by physical
injury, the government acted willfully, or her emotional distress
was caused by a cause of action existing independently therefrom).
It is not difficult to conceive of such a fact pattern. Yet, the court’s
current disfavor of Berry’s level of scrutiny, the court’s stepping
away from strong immunity challenges, and the court’s expansive
interpretation of the Act’s retention of immunity for mental
anguish together make it unlikely that the court will limit immunity
for government-caused mental anguish.
B. The Legislature Likely Will Not Waive Immunity for Mental Anguish
The legislature also seems unlikely to waive immunity for
mental anguish. The legislature seems to support immunity more
than before. Since passing the original version of the Act, the
legislature has amended it to expand immunity. For example, the
legislature responded to the courts’ early distinction between
governmental and proprietary actions by amending the Act to
apply to all government actions or inactions, whether proprietary
or not.220 After the court invalidated that definition as
unconstitutional,221 the legislature responded by reenacting

217. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11.
218. Waite v. Utah Lab. Comm’n, 416 P.3d 635, 656–57 (Utah 2017) (Lee, J., concurring)
(stating vested rights are protected); Puttuck v. Gendron, 199 P.3d 971, 978 (Utah Ct. App.
2008) (holding legal rights enforceable with known remedies are protected); Craftsman
Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1209 (Utah 1999) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (stating remedies, not causes of action are protected—the legislature can still
change the law).
219. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 439 (Utah 1995).
220. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1987) (defining “governmental function”).
221. Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.2d 1007, 1027 (Utah 2002).
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essentially the same amendment.222 In so doing, legislators made
clear they intended to increase governmental immunity beyond
what the prior version of the Act allowed.223
Though the legislature has amended (many times) the parts of
the Act that the court has interpreted narrowly to limit immunity,
the mental anguish exception, which the court has interpreted
broadly in favor of immunity, has remained unamended for fiftyfive years.224 Moreover, the legislature has preferred tort reform
aversive to plaintiff’s interests, if only because defense groups are
inherently more successful in achieving reform than plaintiffs.225
Thus, the legislature seems unlikely to waive immunity for mental
anguish, even if such a waiver would be consistent with the
Act’s purpose and increased legal solicitude toward mental
anguish generally.
CONCLUSION
Utah has expanded emotional distress recovery, and that trend
is likely to continue. In contrast with this trend, the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act retains governmental tort immunity
for any injury arising from or connected to the infliction of mental
anguish. Utah government should be liable for the emotional
distress it causes because immunity in general is qualified and
questionable, blanket immunity for mental injuries is inconsistent
with current legal trends, and government tort liability for mental
injuries would be consistent with the policies supporting immunity
and the Act’s purposes. Though immunity for mental anguish
should be waived, neither the court nor the legislature appear likely
to make that decision. Historical trends and relevant policies
support governmental tort liability for mental anguish, but Utah’s
mental anguish immunity is likely here to stay.

222. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-102(4) (Supp. 2004).
223. E.g., Floor Debate, 55th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 25, 2004) (Senate recording tape no.
39, side A) (statement of Sen. Dave L. Thomas) (“We are headed for a showdown with the [Utah]
Supreme Court[;] hopefully . . . the court will recognize the policy stand we are making.”).
224. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-201(4)(b) (2020); § 60-30-10(2) (1965).
225. Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 367 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring); Roberts & Shah, supra note 106, at 677–79.
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